Before the 1973 war, what assumption did Israeli intelligence make?

• A. Arabs would not challenge Israeli air and armor in open combat
• B. Arabs would rely on guerrilla warfare
• C. Arabs would seek a diplomatic settlement
• D. Arabs would withdraw after airstrikes

Answer: (A)

Prewar intelligence was testing how adversaries would choose to fight. The expected scenario was that Arab states would not dare challenge Israeli air power and armor in a large, open battlefield confrontation. Instead of a full-scale conventional war, planners thought conflicts would be limited, or fought with guerrilla tactics, avoiding direct, massive clashes with Israel’s strongest forces.

This belief proved inaccurate when Egypt and Syria launched a surprise, coordinated assault in 1973, crossing the Suez Canal and attacking the Golan Heights with conventional forces and air support. The Egyptians, in particular, sought to overwhelm Israeli air defenses and push across the canal with massed armor, showing that a conventional open battle could indeed occur.

So the best interpretation is that the assumption was Arabs would not engage in open combat against Israeli air and armor, which is precisely why that option is correct.